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NOTES AND COMMENTS
dictum the court stated that the assignment of the mortgage sufficed to
transfer the debt, so why should a transfer of a mortgagee's interest in
the mortgaged property not havre the same effect? No North Carolina
cases on this point were found. The courts in other jurisdictions adopt
various views. One view is that the grantee acquires at least an equitable
right to the secured indebtedness.17 Another view is that the grantee
acquires the secured indebtedness only if the mortgagee was in possession
of the mortgaged property at the time he executed the deed.1 8
It is submitted that the better view is to give effect to the intention
of the parties where such can reasonably be done. Normally, it seems
the intent would be to transfer all the mortgagee's interest in the
property and the debt, else the grantee would receive nothing of value.
However, where the mortgagee has transferred the secured debt to a
third party for value and then conveys the mortgaged property, the
grantee of the mortgaged property would have to suffer for his own
negligence or ignorance of the facts.' 9
PHILLIP C. RANSDELL
Partnerships-Liability of Partners-Marshalling Assets
The law in North Carolina relative to the rule of marshalling assets
for the benefit of firm and individual creditors is somewhat uncertain.
Before the Uniform Partnership Act' was passed in 1941, the court
held in Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Walston2 that the firm creditor
did not have to exhaust the firm assets before reaching the individual
assets of the partners. The firm was in the hands of receivers who were
in the process of settling the affairs of the business. Partner A had died,
thus dissolving the partnership. Partner B was insolvent and the firm
owed some $62,000, of which $12,500 was owed to the Chemical Com-
pany. A's personal estate was valued at $9,000, with $3,000 out-
standing personal debts against it. The Chemical Company sought to
share in the personal assets of A along with the open unsecured credi-
tors of the personal estate. The trial court held that the Chemical
Company could share in the individual assets of A only to the extent of
the balance unpaid after all dividends from the firm assets had been
received. From this ruling the Chemical Company appealed and the
court, looking to C.S. § 3259,3 reversed the holding of the lower court.
"' Sadler v. Jefferson, 143 Ala. 669, 39 So. 380 (1905) ; Hawkins v. Elston, 58
Cal. 400, 146 Pac. 254 (1915).
18 Wyman v. Porter, 108 Me. 110, 79 Atl. 371 (1911).
"o For a general discussion of this problem, see Ross, The Double Hazard of a
Note and Mortgage, 16 MINN. L. REv. 123 (1932).
'UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-31 to 59-89 (1950).
2187 N.C. 817, 123 S.E. 196 (1924).
'N.C. CODE ANN. § 3259 (Michie 1935). The statute provided in part:
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The court, Justice Stacy writing the opinion, held that the equitable
doctrine that firm creditors could not reach the personal assets of the
partner until the obligations of the separate and private creditors had
been satisfied did not apply in this state since the effect of C.S. § 3259
was to convert creditors of the firm into individual creditors of each
member of the firm.4 Since the liability of the partners was joint and
several, and since the firm assets were not sufficient to pay the firm debts,
the creditors of the partnership were entitled to have their claims allowed
in full, both as against the firm assets and as against the individual
assets of partner A; they were allowed to enforce the two liabilities
concurrently and to obtain their ratable share of each fund.5
In 1941 the Uniform Partnership Act 6 was enacted and C.S. § 3259,
under which the Walston case was decided, was repealed. 7 The new
act provided that the partners were liable jointly for all firm debts and
obligations other than torts and breaches of trust.8
In 1954 Casey v. Granthar 9 was decided by the supreme court.
The plaintiff and another were partners in a cotton ginning and saw-
milling business. The plaintiff and his partner had executed notes
totaling $15,000 to the firm creditor and had secured these notes with a
deed of trust conveying the partnership property and the home and farm
of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to have a dissolution, a settlement
and an accounting of the firm assets, and an injunction to prevent the
trustee from selling the property under the power of sale contained in the
deed of trust. The court, in overruling the dissolution of the temporary
injunction by the lower court, 10 held that each partner had the right to
have partnership property applied to the payment of partnership debts
in order to relieve him from personal liability." The court further
stated:
"General and Special Partners; Liability. Such partnership may consist of one
or more persons, who are general partners, and are jointly and severally re-
sponsible as partners are now by law .... ." (Emphasis added.)
'187 N.C. at 821, 123 S.E. at 198.
187 N.C. at 822, 123 S.E. at 198.
8 See note 1 supra.
7 N.C. Public Laws 1941, c. 251, § 31.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1950). This statute provided: "All partners are
liable
"(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under§§ 59-43 [torts] and 59-44 [breaches of trust].
"(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership ... 
8239 N.C. 121, 79 S.E.2d 735 (1954).
" Transcript of Record, p. 11, Casey v. Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 79 S.E.2d
735 (1954). The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds of mis-
joinder of parties and causes and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The judge, hearing the motion on demurrer, sustained the demurrer, dismissed the
action, and dissolved the temporary restraining order.
2" The court relied, in part, on two Iowa cases: Bankers Trust Co. v. Knee,
222 Iowa 988, 270 N.W. 438 (1938), and Simmons v. Simmons, 215 Iowa 654,
246 N.W. 597 (1933).
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It appears that under the general rule as to marshaling partner-
ship and individual assets, or under the application of b principle
of equity similar to that rule, the rule that partnership debts may
be paid out of individual assets is subject to the modification that
the individual assets may be so applied where, and only where,
there are no firm assets, or where the firm assets have become
exhausted.1
2
The equitable doctrine of marshalling assets of a partnership is that
when the partnership property and the individual properties of the
partners are before the court for distribution, the firm creditors have
priority on firm assets, and individual creditors have priority on indi-
vidual assets.'8  G.S. § 59-70(h) 14 is a codification of that rule. The
court, in deciding the Casey case, did not cite this statute, but based its
decision, at least in part, on G.S. § 59-68 (1).15 This statute, while not
the rule of marshalling assets, is an application of part of the same
principle. It provides that upon dissolution, each partner, as against
his co-partners and all persons claiming through them, may have the
partnership property applied to discharge partnership liabilities. Thus,
if the statutes are read literally, the doctrine of marshalling assets can
only apply when the assets, both firm and individual, are before the court
for distribution. G.S. § 59-68 (1) may be applied.at the dissolution
stage. In applying G.S. § 59-68 (1) in the Casey case, the court spoke
of the rule of marshalling assets16 and cited two Iowa cases"7 to support
its view. This infers that in North Carolina the rule of marshalling
assets is applicable not only when the assets are before the court for
distribution, but also upon dissolution. It will be observed that in the
Casey case the point being decided was the propriety of an injunction
against the trustee to prevent sale of the individual property under the
deed of trust. The court did not order a dissolution. This leaves the
further inference that the rule of marshalling assets may be applied
even before the dissolution.
This raises a problem in the application of G.S. § 59-45.18 In 1953
this statute was amended' 9 so as to hold partners liable jointly and
severally for all obligations of the partnership. This was done to remove
a direct conflict with G.S. § 1-72,20 which declared partners to be
jointly and severally liable for contracts of the partnership.21 Hence,
12 239 N.C. at 126, 79 S.E.2d at 738. 13 187 N.C. at 820, 123 S.E. at 197.
1' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-70(h) (1950).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-68(1) (1950).
' 239 N.C. at 126, 79 S.E.2d at 738.
17 See note 11 supra.
'
8 N.C. Gr. STAT. § 59-45 (Supp. 1955).
See note 18 suPra. 20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-72 (1950).
' A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N.C.L. REV.
375, 429 (1953).
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today the language in the statute is essentially that of C.S. § 3259 under
which the WaIston case was decided.
The effect of the 1953 amendment of G.S. § 59-45 was not referred
to in the Casey decision; the amendment did not become operative until
after the action was filed.22  However, should such a situation arise
today involving a simple unsecured partnership debt, 28 the court would
have to decide whether there is a conflict between the marshalling of
assets rule in G.S. § 59-70(h), giving the individual creditor priority
as to individual assets when assets of the dissolved firm and its partners
are being distributed by the court, and G.S. § 59-45, which makes all
firm debts joint and several obligations of the parties. The Walston
case, in such a situation, held that a statutory provision like the present
G.S. § 59-45 made every firm creditor a creditor also of each individual
partner, with a right to share in the separate assets of each on the same
basis as his separate personal creditors, and that consequently that
statutory provision barred or interfered with the marshalling of assets.
The same result might be ascribed to the present G.S. § 59-45.24
It is at least doubtful, however, whether there be any inconsistency
between these two sections of the North Carolina Uniform Partnership
Act. The marshalling of assets rule is expressly applicable only after
dissolution 25 and only when all the assets involved are in the hands of
the court for distribution. 26  Before that, the debts of the firm are joint
and several obligations under G.S. § 59-45, so that a firm creditor may,
if he desires, get a judgment against an individual partner and collect
from him alone. When the court takes over the assets for distribution,
in marshalling the assets the holder of such a judgment not yet paid
must be recognized as a creditor of any partners who are named as
judgment debtors, and presumably also as a creditor of the firm.
Similarly, the holder of a note signed by the firm, and signed or en-
dorsed also by the separate partners, would be entitled to proof against
the estates of all his promisors; the creditor who has taken steps to
formalize his claim against the individual partners must be given the
benefit of his foresight. But it does not follow that the creditor whose
" The action was filed in the superior court in December, 1952. Transcript of
Record, p. 1, Casey v. Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 79 S.E.2d 735 (1954). The amend-
ment did not become effective until July 1, 1953. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 59-45 (Supp.1955).,23 The last clause in G.S. § 59-70(h) expressly excludes "lien and secured
creditors" from subjection to the rule of marshalling assets.
" The marshalling of assets provision in G.S. § 59-70(h) might be held so
inconsistent with the 1953 amendment of G.S. §. 59-45 that the latter enactment
repealed the former by implication. Or it might be held that the effect of the
amendment of G.S. § 59-45 is simply to enlarge the class of those who are to be
treated as creditors of the individual partners in applying G.S. § 59-70(h), placing
all firm creditors in that class.
" See'the first sentence in G.S. § 59-70.
"6 See note 14 suPra.
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contract was with the firm alone, a contract which is made by statute a
joint and several obligation of the several partners, is by that statute
entitled not only to priority in the firm assets as a firm creditor, but
also to parity of treatment in the separate partners' individual estates
with the partners' personal creditors. The rule of marshalling assets
contained in G.S. § 59-70(h) does not deny firm creditors rights also
as creditors of the separate partners; but it does deny them the pre-
ferred position as to individual assets which it grants to the personal
creditors of the partners (just as it gives firm creditors a like preference
as to firm assets).
The statute as to joint and several liability is procedural only.27
The firm creditor with no more than a joint obligation is in truth a
creditor of the separate partners; but in order to enforce his claim he
must join them all as defendants. Once he has overcome this procedural
obstacle and has his judgment, he may collect the whole amount out of
property of any one of the judgment debtors, exactly as if his claim were
joint and several.28  There seems to be no sound reason for any dif-
ference between a joint and several creditor, as to their substantive
rights.
The theory of the Walston case, however, is hardly consistent with
this view. Until the court deals with the problem again, it cannot be
concluded whether the Casey decision has resulted in a liberalization





In Reed v. Elmore,' a landowner subdivided a tract of land into
seven lots and sold five of them with no restrictions as to use. She
conveyed Lot No. 3 to plaintiff by deed stipulating that the land therein
conveyed should be subject to the restriction that no structure be erected
thereon by the grantee within a stipulated distance from the public
road. This deed, which was properly recorded by plaintiff, contained
the further provision, "This restriction shall likewise apply to Lot No.
4, retained by the grantor, said Lot No. 4 being adjacent to lands hereby
conveyed." Subsequently, the owner sold this adjacent Lot No. 4,
which defendant had obtained by mesne conveyances, the deed contain-
ing no reference to the restriction. The plaintiff covenantee, owner of
CRANE, PARTNERSnIP 519 (2d ed. 1952).
2 WLmsTON, CONTRACTs § 316 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 4 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 928(1951).
1246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957).
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